The E-ISAC Brochure describes the products and services provided to asset owners and operators and select government and cross-sector partners in North America.
The brochure is intended to provide potential E-ISAC Portal members an overview of the benefits of joining the E-ISAC Portal, what types of information to share, and how to share with the E-ISAC.
The E-ISAC Physical Security Analysis Team in coordination with the Physical Security Advisory Group has developed the attached Copper Theft Prevention White Paper using insight from industry experts, as well as open source resources. This paper aims to provide copper theft prevention best practices and lessons learned that asset owners and operators (AOOs) have implemented sucessfully in North America. Please feel free to submit any additional prevention and mitigation techniques to email@example.com for future updates.
Russia leads as countries begin migration from Windows to Linux
Russia, China, and South Korea are all migrating from Windows to Linux. Russia and China cite security concerns while South Korea cites cost reduction.
Top phishing subject lines
Personal web data removal workbook
The detonation of a nuclear weapon at high altitude or in space (~ 30 km or more above the earth’s surface) can generate an intense electromagnetic pulse (EMP) referred to as a high-altitude EMP or HEMP. HEMP can propagate to the earth and impact various land-based technological systems such as the electric power grid. Because of the extreme differences in views among experts regarding the potential impacts of HEMP on the electric power grid and the potential societal implications, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) launched a three-year research project in April 2016 to investigate the potential impacts of a HEMP attack on the electric transmission system and to identify possible options for mitigating impacts. This report summarizes the research and findings of this three-year research effort.
The President’s National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) recently published a draft report titled: Surviving a Catastrophic Power Outage: How to Strengthen the Capabilities of the Nation. The EISAC is working with the Electricity Subsector Coordinating Council and our members to address the report’s recommendations. Please find it attached and available online here.
The Public Service Commission of Wisconsin (PSC) released its Strategic Energy Assessment (SEA), a biennial report that assesses Wisconsin’s energy demands and the reliability of the electrical system.
“The assessment released today tells a great story of Wisconsin’s energy portfolio and its relationship with customers across the state,” PSC Chairman Lon Roberts said. “The commission’s dedication to providing safe, affordable, and reliable energy to all customer classes is detailed throughout this year’s Strategic Energy Assessment.”
The report – which includes data from Wisconsin utilities, power cooperatives, municipal electric companies, and other electricity and transmission providers – found that the typical Wisconsin family pays similar to what other Midwest states pay for energy.
The report also looks at Wisconsin’s clean energy portfolio. Wisconsin utilities have met their 10 percent renewable portfolio goals and many are looking to expand efforts to cut emissions.
“There will always be room for improvement and efficiencies,” Roberts said. “However, I believe the SEA outlines and describes the significant progress we and our stakeholders have made in addressing the challenges facing Wisconsin and a clear path ahead to continue progress in achieving our goal of safe, reliable, and affordable energy for all customer classes.”
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD)/Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis (OCIA) assesses that unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) provide malicious actors an additional method of gaining undetected proximity to networks and equipment within critical infrastructure sectors. Malicious actors could use this increased proximity to exploit unsecured wireless systems and exfiltrate information. Malicious actors could also exploit vulnerabilities within UASs and UAS supply chains to compromise UASs belonging to critical infrastructure operators and disrupt or interfere with legitimate UAS operations.